![]() ![]() ![]() Panic, but this weakness is worth being aware of. The end result is that most cryptoloop users need not go into an immediate Salting the password will render the dictionary attack impractical. If the range of salt values is large enough, The effect of requiring an attacker to create a separate dictionary forĮvery possible number. The salt value has to be retrievable, but it has Passwords, where the password is modified by a randomly-chosen value before One is toĬhoose a lengthy, non-obvious password. There are two ways of getting around this sort of problem. Surprising if government agencies and other, relatively organized groups ThisĪttack is not practical for casual snoopers, but it would not be entirely Yield the password and enable decryption of the entire filesystem. WithĪccess to the actual, encrypted disk, a quick lookup in the dictionary will Passwords and the resulting ciphertext that will appear on disk. Processor, an attacker can generate an exhaustive dictionary of likely For any given filesystem type, the contents ofĬertain sectors will be easy to predict. The problem, it seems, is that cryptoloop is susceptible to a certain kind Worth a look, even if there may be no need for immediate panic. If you are using (or considering) cryptoloop. ![]() Jari obliged with a clear, technical explanation of More details on the "back-doored" cryptoloop. It will come as no surprise that this message was followed by requests for derivatives suchĪs Debian, SuSE, and others are also back-doored. Have always shipped back-doored loop crypto, and now mainline folksĪre shipping back-doored loop crypto. Vulnerability that is equivalent to back door. Mainline loop crypto implementation has exploitable If you want your data secure, you need to re-encrypt your dataĪnyway. ![]()
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